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Iran's connections with Syria; current status and future
perspective
Desperate not to let the Assad regime fall, Tehran continues to support and
strengthen connections with its ally in Damascus. What unites them in this
alliance?
Seyed Ali Alavi
20 June 2014
Iranian Ambassador Ghadanfar Rokn Abadi announcing aid to Syrian
refugees. Demotix/Issam Abdallah. All rights reserved
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Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the Islamic Republic of Iran has
become a vital and critical player within the Syrian political arena. Iran
is perceived by many political commentators as a more major
supporter of the Damascus regime than even the Russian Federation.
What are the roots of Iran's connections with Syria, its main strategic
preferences and targeted objectives? 
After the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and throughout the
1980s, Syria (under president Hafiz al-Assad) was the only Arab state
which supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. In the early 1980s, when Israel
invaded Lebanon, Iran dispatched 1500 Revolutionary Guards to Syria
with Damascus granting them direct access to the borders with
Lebanon. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards offered training and
funding to the local Shia communities in Lebanon and subsequently a
concrete anti-Israeli front came into existence with joint Iranian-Syrian
support. Syria's support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war weakened
Baghdad's position and helped Iran to gain a footstep in Lebanon and
to expand its influence within the Levant. Iran's aim is to export its
ideological and revolutionary messages throughout the region and to
create a buffer zone around the state of Israel via Hezbollah and the
Palestinian Islamic factions. To this end, Syria remains a vital ally for the
Iranian clerical leadership who do not recognise Israel as a legitimate
state in the region.
Throughout the 1990s Tehran and Damascus maintained strong ties and
worked hand in hand to preserve a sustainable equilibrium within the
region. In 2003, after the American-led invasion of Baghdad, Iran and
Syria strengthened their relations even more in response to the United
States' hostile attitudes towards Tehran and Damascus. However, Iran's
relations with Syria are not limited to the political stage and both sides
have been keen to cement their economic and cultural ties. Iran built
petroleum and gas refineries in Syria and established a joint car industry
with 80 per cent Iranian and 20 percent Syrian shares. Tehran and
Damascus expanded their joint projects on the agricultural and
industrial level. Iranian tourists and pilgrims visiting Syria boosted
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Damascus' fragile economy. In parallel to economic and cultural ties,
both sides strongly emphasise their strategic and geopolitical
cooperation on Lebanon and Palestine.
The Iranian-Syrian connections are tied up with strategic and tactical
dimensions grounded in a common ideology. The secular regime of
Syria is mainly controlled by the Alawites, nevertheless, the Islamic
Republic of Iran remains the only theocratic state to support the Assad
regime. The aim of such a strong alliance is ultimately to overcome
American-Israeli hegemony within the region and counterbalance the
influence of the Arab regimes that have close ties with Washington
such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
From Tehran's perception, Syria is significant  for a number of reasons.
First, Syria is a strategic gate allowing Iran to enter the Arab world.
Second, Iran views Syria as a potential and reliable ally against the
American-Israeli domination of the Middle East. Finally, the most
important factor is that Syria is the "safe bridge" that facilitates Iran's
access to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian rejectionist
factions.  
The position of Iran in regard to the current crisis in Syria is clear. Tehran
makes considerable efforts to support Assad's regime to remain in
power and survive the crisis. The Iranian backed Lebanese Hezbollah
plays a critical role by sending its troops on the ground to fight the
battle in Syria against anti-Assad forces with Iran's approval. Syria under
President Bashar al-Assad tilted even more towards Iran than during the
time of his father, Hafez-al Assad. This is mainly because Syria was
deeply alarmed by the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and viewed
American foreign policy in the region as a threat to its security.
Hezbollah's military and political achievements during the war with
Israel in 2006 have also incited Damascus to strengthen its connections
with Iran and Hezbollah's leadership, to cement a buffer zone around
Israel.
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During the 'Arab Spring', the Syrian regime controlled by the Alawite
minority confronted significant resistance throughout the country by a
majority Arab-Sunni population that opposed the Assad family's four
decades of absolute rule. The Syrian rebellion attracted sympathy
throughout the Arab Sunni states as well as Turkey, and financial and
logistical support was channelled to the Syrian anti-Assad forces by the
Gulf Cooperation Council through Turkey. This issue hardened the
situation for the Syrian regime and highlighted the significance of Iran
as the most influential regional ally for Damascus.
Since the 2011 crisis in Syria, the political and military ties between
Damascus and Tehran have significantly strengthened. The Islamic
Revolutionary Guard has become the most influential external element
in Syria by providing training and offering professional consultations to
the Syrian army. The Revolutionary Guard's mounting influence
became more visible when its corps logistically supported Hezbollah's
paramilitary troops fighting on the ground to safeguard the Syrian
regime.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is under increasing sanctions, engineered
by the western powers, for its nuclear programme. Nevertheless, Tehran
is not willing to witness the loss of its closest ally in the region. The fall of
Assad's regime will have a negative impact on Iran's ability to expand
its influence within the Arab world and reduce Iran's access to
Hezbollah. For the Iranian government, Syria remains the safest path to
Southern Lebanon, the power base of Hezbollah. The alternative route
to Lebanon is either Turkey or through international sea lines.
Since Ankara pursues anti-Assad policies and competes with Tehran in
the region, and since the western powers monitor the sea routes, such
alternatives are unviable. The collapse of the Syrian regime would
weaken Iran and Hezbollah's standing against their ideological enemy,
Israel. The Iranian leadership is convinced that the fall of Assad's regime
could incite the hardliners in Tel Aviv to conduct military operations
against Hezbollah's power bases in Lebanon and even Iran's nuclear
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facilities. In other words, supporting the current Syrian regime has its
security and geopolitical significance for the Iranian leadership.
The recent news indicates that the balance of military power is
changing in favour of pro-Assad forces. If President Bashar al-Assad
with the triangular support network of Iran-Hezbollah and Russia
remains in power and overcomes the crisis, Damascus inevitably will
emerge as more dependent on Iran and Russia than before. Having
most of its economy and infrastructure shattered during the civil war
and being politically isolated regionally and internationally, the Assad
regime has only Tehran and Moscow to count on to revive its severely
exhausted economy and politically weakened government. However,
Russia and Iran are currently facing increased sanctions imposed by
the west and therefore are  already heavily engaged in overcoming
the financial impact of the sanctions. The question remains for the long
term - to what extent are Iran and Russia able to renovate Syria's
economy and respond to its financial needs? 
The supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, who guides Iran's
foreign policy, defines Syria as a vital element of the "Regional Axis of
anti-Zionism". Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic of Iran pursues a
pragmatic policy towards developments in Syria. Tehran views its
strategic interests beyond President Bashar al-Assad. Although Iran
strongly prefers al-Assad to remain as head of state in Syria, Tehran
attempts to reach out to the ruling Alawite community and other
minorities involved in the current system to maintain its interests in Syria.
Tehran thoroughly looks into other possible scenarios and aims to
facilitate the establishment of paramilitary forces such as the Al-Mahdi
Army in Iraq and powerful political institutions such as the Al-Dawa
party in Iraq, to preserve its influence in Syria and minimise the
destruction of Syria's governmental agencies loyal to al-Assad's regime.
To this end, Hezbollah remains an instrumental and crucial element.
Tehran's main goal is to ensure that its channels to Hezbollah remain
open and Iran's grand-interests in the Levant guarded and preserved.
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